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PRAGMATISM: THE NEW METHOD IN THE 
TIIEORY OF KNOWLEDGE. 
The 014 familiar statement, "There is nothing 
new under the sun", bears itself out in philo8(~phical 
methods as well as in our physical and chemical labor-
atories, waere we actually demonstrate that a.ll things 
are 014 and only seemingly new, because man, in his need 
for them, has found them as already existing 10 these 
many years. In most of the articles written for our 
philosophical and psychological periodicals we find the 
writer; starting with the philosophy of Kant and then 
working to his own conclusions. But back of Kant what? 
All principles that will satisfy we find grounded in 
those thoughts ot the 014 Greeks who atter all struck 
deep down to the fundamentals and gave us the seeis or 
promise from which have sprouted and grown the various 
manifestations of philosophical vegetation. 
In this respect 1f' in no other the very modern 
movement 1n epistemologioal theory, known as Pragmatism, 
does not eii.ffer from t.lf~s companion philosophies. 
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Heraoktu5 recognized the theory o~ relatiTity whioh con-
tained. the dootrine o-r sense perception and the subjec-
tive factor included in it. It is altogether true that 
dirferent individuals are affected differently by one and 
the same objeot; and the different states in whioh the 
individual tints himself Causes the object to appear ai~­
f'erent to him. Institutions, laws and truths, though 
adapted ·to one perio4 of mants career are wholly incon-
gruous and inapplicable in a later stage of his develop-
ment. So without this sense ot relatiTity no explanation 
at all satisfact ory can be made of the changes between 
the good and the evil, the beau.:tiful and the. ugly o~ the 
past and present. 
But Pragmatism may be said to have had its very 
beginning in the Homo-mansura doctrine of Protag. raa in 
which we learn that all that is true, beautiful and gooi, 
is such only for the knowing, feeling and willing sub-
ject, a permanent truth. This doctrine of course has 
caused many aisputes among historians, but perhaps it 1s 
more clearly understood by Goethe who says, "I have ob-
serve. that I hold that thought to be true which is tru1t-
~ul for me, which adjusts itself to the general direction 
• I 
of my thought and at the same time furthers me in it, ROW 
it is not oply possible but natural, that such a thought 
should not chime in with the sense of another person, nor 
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further him, even perhaps be ahind~ance to him, and so 
he will hol4 it to be false. When I know my relation to 
myself and to the outer worl", I say that I possess the 
1 . 
truth." This, it may be considere4, is more really what 
Protagoras meant, but be that as it may we can easily see 
that herein lies the rise ot the Pragmatic theory. So 
Aristotle in the statement that the most general truths 
must be immediately certain; Desoartes in his Toluntar-
istia psychological theories; Spinoza in his theory that 
things ~annot exist in isolation, but must somehow be-
long to every other part, his causal hypothesis as an 
eternal and ultimate relation; Locke with his theory ot 
empirioism; and Kant in placing the will in te~s ot 
cat'Q,gories and postulates and in not holain! reason as 
forming the basis of our faculties and of things, all 
give us pragmatic tendencies. 
But Pragmatism is not of German origin, tor it 
was the English speaking philosophers who first introdue-
e~ the custom of interpret inc the meaninC of conceptions 
by asking what difference those conceptions would make 
for life. All this at first resulted in negations and 
contradictions and it has only been within the last few 
years that the theory of truth a8 practioal and useful 
\ 
has created any great sti:r:- in philosophical c1roles. 
1. Goethe - Zellerscher Briefwechsel, T. 3tj -'? 
q • 
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This agitation, in fact, has become so great that some 
of our Idealists and Realists have been much alarme. lest 
philosophy should sink into mere utility and subjecti ,i sm. 
Even before an~ systematizing of the theory has yet been 
done; even, we might say, while it is yet in a state o~ 
formation, there is much concern lest it in its very 
youth, though with the strength o~ a giant, ohoke our 
earlier and alreaay well organized systems of philosophy. 
And though the practical advantages ot Pr~gmatlsm be s ig-
nificant, the reforms to be affected by it are so sweep-
inc that 1 t J like 78:very .... ether theo ry or method. which has 
been int roduc ed wi thin the hist 0 ry o-r philosophy, has 
muoh to 40 in order to buil' battlements sufficient to 
-withstand its opponents and at the same time to form it-
self into a systematized whole. But either aiae that one 
chooses as his own, he finds himself in excellent company 
and all rests on the appeal whioh this problem makes to 
the indi Ti dual's own way of thinkin«. And with this stat e-
ment one subjeots kimsel! immediately to the theory of 
Pragmatism. 
This word Pragmatism is deriTe4 from the Greek 
word. /Tpa..1 ~ ~ meanin~ aotion, trom whioh our words "prao-
tioe" and "praotioal" come. It was first introduoed into 
' 1 
philosophy by Mr. C. S. Pierce in 18?8. The wor~ and 
the id.ea o'ar-r1ed ,vi th it lay d.onnan2( until 1898 when 
..i .. ., 
1. It How to make Our Ideas Clear': Popular Soienoe Monthly 
Yol, · 4l1, 
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Professor James brought it forward in his lecture in 
Cali fornia before the Philosophical Union at the Univer-
l '~' 
ai t y. It was very natural that this attempt to giTe 
an account of knowlecige ~i thout assuming its absolllte 
Tal1d,ity would. bring about a shapp and searching reoon-
sideration of the whole epistomological question. Some 
of our most advanced. thinkers, besides Professor James, 
who have espoused. this new method are Professor Dewey, 
Schiller and Moore. But just about three years ago a 
reaction set in against the movement; it made itself 
felt at the Princeton meet inc of the Philosophical As-
sociation in papers read by Professor s .!-Royce. Creighton 
and Baldwin . And in the meantime, others who consider 
themselTes, Absolutists, Realists, etc. have joined these 
thinkers. Owing to these conditions all of our philo-
sophical periodicals have been filled with arguments both 
for and against this method. In such articles the move-
ment is spoken of at times with respect, at other times 
with scornful insolence, but seldom with clear til'ld dJrect 
understandinc.And it is this clear understandinc of the 
pragmatic movement or tendency that I wish first to de-
fine before proceedin& to any vital discussion of the 
subj ect. 
Pragmatism is not a ~octr1ne or .a wor. Beither 
is it a theory nor an hypothesis, nor does it carry with 
it any new facts; but rather it is a shift1nc ot 
1. tlPhilo.sophi,oal Conoeptions and. Practical Results". 
,. 
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att i tud.es held in the past. It assumes no f"undamentals 
t"rom which to buila up a syst am of philosoph,., tor it 
is no system. It has no dogmatic principles. It is not 
a great school like that ot Absolute Iaealism or Realism. 
It is only an attitude towards, a test ot, and as it 
were a position from which to reTiew all philosophical 
propositions. As define. by Professor ~ames, "Pracma-
tism is the method for astimatinc the practical Talue 
. 1 
and results ot philosophical conceptions:" and accor4-
inc to :Mr. Schiller, it is, "The thorouclt reco&n1t1on 
that the ~rposiTe character of mental lite, ~eneral17, 
must influenoe a.nd preTaae a.lso our most co~nftlTe 
2 
actiTltias". From these two definitions it is quite 
eTi4ent that the basic ideas ot Pragmatism are, that 
Talue is equal to praotical utility, that the ori«in ot 
all knowledge, beliefs and acts originate in the Tol-
untaristio nature, and that intellect is only an in-
strumental medium tor accomplishinr; the d.esired ends, 
• 
and at the same time the empirical attitude is maintain-
ed in the aetermininc of all truths. 
Pragmatism asks the question: What ~1fference 
will this idea make .i n the praotioal work1n~ out of 
1. "Philosophical Comcept1ons and Practical Results", 
A.dress be~ore the Philosophioal Union, UniTersity 
ot California, 1898. 
2. "Humanism", Chapter 1, p. 8. 
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my life; what effects tkat mdght have practical bear-
ings will the object ot conception haTe in experienoe? 
I n the f aot the whole meaninc of a oonception expresses 
itselt in practical consequences, consequences whioh, 
if the conception be true, are either in the form o~ 
conduot to be recommended, or in the form ot experienoe 
to be expeote.. English Empiricism has asked the ques-
tion, from 'whence came tae question? while Pra«matism 
asks, where does it go? They asked from ~hat simple 
ideas of experience or from what impressions the conoep-
tion was put together; while Pra~matism asks, what ef-
fect on our aotion is the conception bound to haTe an. 
what difference will it make with us in the future? 
They appeal to past experience and our new tendenoy ap-
peals to tuture experience. If we can tina no con-
sequentaal 4ifferences between two ideas there can 
really be no difference between the i4eas themselT8s. 
And when just this test of findlnc a concrete conse-
quenoe is place' upon philosophioal disputes it is sur-
prisinC how many of them totally loose t~eir significance. 
If this simple formula were applied to all our systems 
of philosophy we woul. soon haTe a philosophy of Tital 
importanoe to everyone at every instant of his lite. 
Christ place4 this test on allot his dootrines, and 
throuth many hundre4s of years his doctrines have lastea 
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and. to a.ll accounts will still ring t rue in thousands of 
years to come. And this is beoause they make a «efinite 
differenoe to each of us at each definite instant ot our 
life. 
The wor4s, Matter, Reason, Absolute etc. which 
meta.physios has brought out af't er so many laborious quest s 
are the end of the labors. But try to pick out of each 
its practical oash Talue in the life ot an indiTi4ual 
experienoe and what haTe you that satisfies you? Are 
they not rather only outlines for further work? Th1nkin& 
after all is only for the sake of a01n«, and "thought 
in mOTement has for its only conceiTable motl~e the at-
. 1 
tainment of belief' or thoucht at rest." Sure and safe 
action oannot becin until thought 'has tound its rest in 
belief. So if in some thought taere shoula be a part 
that would have no place in the practical consequenoes 
of the action, it has no r1gh.t to be a.n element of the 
thought's significance. "Bence to a.ttain perfeot clear-
ness in our thought of an object, we need only oonsider 
what sensations ilIIdlEidiate or remote are oonoei Table for 
us to expect from it and what oonduct we must prepare 1n 
case the object should be true. Our conception of these 
practical consequenoes 1s for us the whole of our con-
ception of the object, so far as that conception has 
1. James, "Varieties of Religious Experience", p.449. 
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posltiTe signifioance at all". 
But the objection is made, if that is just a 
phase in a single process it would be hard to see how it 
can have any effioiency at all. If it is only a funotion 
of an action how can this idea ha,Te creatiTe and con-
2 
at roct i Te power and at the same time be a.n inst rument? 
But Pragmatism replies, needs fashioned. the ideas. 
And it is quite probable that experience woul4 haTe re-
mained. unreflect.ive in its character, it' the aotiTities 
of life had always been performed smoothly. But when 
the old reactions will no longer suffice there is a re-
sultin£ conflict; the concrete whole of stimulus ana 
responseis in a manner broken up and there is a oertain 
isolation of the conscious stimuius. The Pragmatist 
by his "reaction theory" implies that when we intel-
lectualize pure experience we should do this in order 
to aeseend to the pure a.nd concrete level; for, if the 
intellect stays amon~ the abstract and generalized 
terms and with its conclusion does not reassert itself 
in some partioular point in the practical lite, it does 
not perform its normal function. This constant chancinc 
ot' brains, in this direction and then in tkat direotlon 
at particular times into particular ideas is e~ual to 
1. James, "Varieties of Religious Experience, :p. ·444 
2. Creighton, ' "Purpose as Logical Category", Phil. ReT. 
Vol. XIIl. 
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their permanent tendenoy in permanent directions. Thus 
the personal tone of eaoh mind, which makes it more in-
tereste. in one phase of experience than another, and 
makes it more attractiT8 to certain impressions and reasons, 
1s due to the irib~ rent tendency o~ the nerTOUS system 
which makes a certain brain aot in a certain way. 
This takes us back to the primitive beginnin_ 
of the origin of our iaeas; and this origin accor4ing 
to the Pragmatist rests upon man's volitional nature. 
Will, as the fundamental functl~n of the min4, 1s not 
deriTed from presentation, but, without intell'genoe, 
comes as a craving, a desire or an impNlse and intel-
ligenoe has its function only as it finds or inTents ways 
or means to acoomplish the desires. The fundamental 
funotion of a desire 1s comfortable.ness, then the 
direotion of our interest and attentlon is determined 
by pleasures and benefits which ~@~tain parts o~ our ert-
" 
Tironment y •• 14 and pains and injuries which other 
parts infliot: thus intelleot is for the direction o~ 
the acoumulateci mental experiences and for an acoomplish-
inc of practioal ends in terms of our desires. In 
psychioal terms we first haTe a :f'eelinc in the presence 
of an object and then a movement away from or towar4 
the object. Thus, before knowledge of any kind we must 
have attention, ana to have attention we must haTe .e-
sire, and before aesire the primary feelinc for or against 
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something. Professor James says, that, "The prime raotor 
in the philosOphical oraving is the desire to have ex-
peotancy defined.". Of course the nature of this expectancy 
depends on man's enTironment, his past experience and his 
own voluntaristic nature. If his natural tendenoy is a 
~eelin, of hardness and despondency, ir his environment 
is dark and gloomy, and ir his experience has been one 
o~ depri vat ion and "hard luck", then his expeotancy is 
likely to be one of gloomy rorebodinls; and the i r expect-
ing suoh a future his actions will be of a "don't care" 
manner (perfectly consistent with his state of Ednd) and 
thus his «loomy forebodincs will be realizea, for, ao-
cording to Professor James,"every idea tends to aat it-
sel1' out". 
This id.ea has its part icular use in the rield 
ot religion. Amid all the varieties of religious fee line 
the one most constant conoeption of the DiT1ne has been, 
not Bome desecateci formula about the unity of the 
Universe wrought out from some co14 metaphysical hypothesis, 
but it has been a demand for something in response to the 
outory of the human heart. We are well aware that the 
Encliahman's God is not our Goa, neither is John's God 
Jaok's Go4. Each person in the UniTerse has in his mind 
a oonception of tpat God tlaat suits his needs and his 
purposes best. This question is one that can never be 
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solTeQ. through the intricacies of logi.c or by intellectual 
gymnastics, and such a principle as Pragmatism will help 
us to decide which attributes among the scholastio in-
ventories are most significant. What makes our religion 
meaningful is not some cold abstract definition and 
system which for our human needs are al)solutely worthless. 
It is the moral attributes that count. It is they that 
positiyely call for an expression of our hopes and fears 
and build the foundation for our religious life. 
However Pragmatism would not that this questi on 
be settled cy a sentimental preference, but it must be 
decided as to whether or not our belief will be useful 
to us. Here we follow our volitions and if we form a 
belie! that is true to our volitional nature and fully 
fJ4". 
expect it to work out to our use and adv~ncement, we 
will work on this principle of belief and chanCe it, ac-
~ 
cording as to whether or not we fina it workin, out in 
our experience. Even as the scientist's interests cen-
ter on the known or becoming known so also 1s this prin-
ciple demanded of the man of action in religion. Mr. 
Schiller commends this argument as a "most salutary doc-
trine to preach to a biped oppressed by many "ologies" 
like modern man, and calculated to allay his growin« 
doubts; whether he has a responsible personality and a 
soul and a conscience of his own, and is not a mere 
phantasmagoria of abstractions, a transient complex of 
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shadowy formulas that Science calls "the laws o~ nature'. 
Its great lesson is that there are not really any eternal" 
and not human truths to prohi bit us from adoptin" the 
• 
beliefs we need to live by, nor any infallible a Ert~~ 
tests of trut~ to screen us from the consequences o~ our 
1 
choice". 
In all this Pragmatism does not deny or attempt 
to annihilate the intellect, but merely to reint.erpret 
it and make it one with the rest of man t s nature. The 
cognitive relations are very import.ant to the radical 
empiricist, and holdin, fast to them means takin, them 
at their face value. This means, of course, taki,ng them 
just as we feel them and not abstractly talking about 
them. R~re' Professor James makes his posi tion as to 
the subjectiTe ana objective relations very clear. 
"The distinction between subjectiTe and objeotive is not 
one of t~ substance, but of relation within experience. 
Affectional experiences commonly supposea to bear upon 
them the stamp of subjectivity, are not an exception to 
this principle, but when rightly understood., stren«then 
the position. Emotional experiences are not real affec-
tions of the mint, but are ambi~uous in their reference; 
they may be taken as objectiTe or subjectiTe. The 
emot ions tend to remain relati vely pure, because no 
urgent neea has arisen in practical life requirinc them 
1. "Humanism", Preface p. XV1. 
-14-
to be assignea rigorously to one class or the other. 
Arfectional attributes are without influence upon all 
physical nature beyond the limits of our own bodies. 
Since, however, they proauce immediate bodily effects upon 
,),1 
us they yet are"!lambiguous status. The exist.ence ot' t.hi.s 
/ 
ambiguous class of experiences proves, that subjective 
and objective are not absolutely different substances, 
but are contexts within experience". There is no suci\ 
thin, as mere intellection, for that whioh is ord1narjly 
so called is m~re purposive thought pursuing its deaired 
end. And the whole of human life is unified by emphasiz-
in, the whole ~adin, purposiveness ot human ~ond.uct .• 
The only cr1 tic ism of the results of our experience comes 
through their use; and we haTe no other .,fay of judginl 
except through experience. Only when our assumptions 
~ail to work .are we justifiea in theorizin& and haTe to 
modify them. To be sure one part of our experience leans 
upon another part, but, according to Pragmatism, when 
taken altogether it is self-sustainin« and leans on noth-
ing beyond experienoe. 
Hence we find that intelligence 1s d~e to the 
will or to the practical purposes, or~ in other words, 
that the value of knowledge is an instrumental value. 
F~owledge is of use only as it provides ways and means 
towards the desired ends. To attain a conclusion our 
thoughts must be propelled and guided by the promptincs 
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o~ volition and desire. Hence it is evident that logic, 
which has t~:j{ en the phase of our thinking as irrelevant, 
assumes a very a1fferent complexion, and becomes more 
natural and more clear when reformed by Pragmatism. 
Purely useless thoughts may be · internally consistent, but 
such a system would constitute only a -logical philosophy. 
All this has lead to what is now termed the Prag-
matist 'a theory o:f truth. If thought is always determin'-ea r , 
by its relation to a specific situation and to a de~inite· 
problem, one would naturally conclude that a thought's 
standard of success and test of adequacy is founa in the 
practical sucoess which it achieves in the indiTldual t s 
experience. Only the workable, useful and efficient is 
true. The not us e·ful, unworlca bl e ana non- effici ent are 
False. And here 1s where the Pragmatist's principle ot 
selection comes in. If truth is to be really safe and 
more than an individual valuation it would transfonm itself 
into a cormnon property. The way in which that is aone 
1s one way in which the Pragmatists claim to have made 
a real advance in our comprehension of Truth. "It 
contends that once more, only more signally and clear-
ly than in the indi v:i. dual case, it is the usefulness a.na 
efficiency of the propositions, for which Truth is claim-
ed, that determines their social recognition. The use 
criterion selects the individual truth valuations, and 
constitutes thereby the objective truth which obtains 
-16-
1 
social recognition." And in order that we may attain 
perfect clearness in our thought of any obj ect, we need 
only consider what effects ot conceiTably practical kina 
the object may haTe. Hence there is no difference in 
abstract truths which do not express themselTes in a dit-
terence of concrete facts. " 
T~is seems to place truth under an indiTiiual 
" criterion. But ir trutk is to be really safe and more 
than an in4iTidual Taluation, it must transfor.m 1tsel~ 
1nto a common property. But this concrete test has neTer 
been a~reed upon,~or what one person has decided on .all-
in, truth, another haa consl«ered false. And the psy-
oholo,lcal, truth Taluations are recogn1zet as subjectlTe 
~ , " 
and somewhat ~OF...aot"fC~":· ,, 
Here we hear the opponent o~ thit;S theory sayinc_ 
" 
you destroy all system, you create a chaos out o~ your 
universe. Each experience depend1n& on the sum o~ its 
own exper1 eno es alone, makes the'( 'worl' many inst ead. of 
one, and many in confusion ani without orciler. This 
metho4 limits you to IndiTidual and personal experience, 
and therefore cannot o~fer any explanation rrom a more 
inclusive stanapoint. Pracmatism, when put to the ,test, 
becomes a lonesome kind o~ theory, tor there is no 
stanaar4. There should be a companionship in our juic-
menta, and conronmation to the true as Buch. Practice 
1. SchIller, F.C.S.- "Humanism", Chapter 111, p. 59. 
-17-
is due to individual conceptions, while truth is 
relatiTe, not to indiTiQual consciousness, but to an 
ideal or universal oonsciousness. And this is why some 
things whioh are practical for some people are not prac-
tioal for others. In practice we make somethinc, while 
we fin~ truth, ana we cannot either make False True or 
True False. One group cannot say that a certain propo-
sition 1s true and another group say that it is not true, 
but the True must be wholly unaffected. Truth is to be 
. , 
found in experience, but experience not of the IndiTidual 
'\(l 
but of the ~n versal experience and therefore all prac-
tical tests ot Truth are impossible. 
To the Idealist thought is not separate from 
real1t), but it is its very nature to be one with the 
real, ana no "bell" is necessary to tell us when we haTe 
reached reality. "Truth is a systematic whole, torminl 
a single indi Tidual experience, which is compos eci of 
elements or constituents which are in their tum in-
d1viaual experiences. Eut each of the practical ex-
perienoes reflects the whole system from its own peculiar 
point of Tiew. Jn4 the whole oan exist only so far as 
it expresses its nature in the system of its parts, ana 
\- .. 
th~ ~"Pa:rtr~ ··," ca.n: ;.have no beinc or meaninr; except a.s the 
, 1 
whole expresses itsel~ throuth them.-
We will a<im1 t that this theory will a.t onoe 
1. A.E.Taylor - Metaphysics, p. 95. 
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close the ar,ument for the aesthetically inclined. The 
apparent fra,;ment arines S 0'[ the ' Pragmatic theory of Truth 
has 144d many to call it uC1y, while the wholeness, the 
finished roundness, and systematic oneness of tke 
Absolutist fa theory has led many to embrace it and to 
keep it as their own. But on what is aesthetics based, 
but on our own yolitional nature, our desires to be pleas-
ed; and if this theory satisfies these desires it 1s ac-
cepted by means ot the pra~atic attitude. Are not the 
et ernal t rutlas ~'lt efl all those demands that we make upon 
our experience because we need them in order that we 
' 7 
may have a cosmos fit to live 1n. ,Grant that the Tnle 
ana the Real are an absolute :f'ixea somewhat, will it mean 
anything except as it 1s instrumental in our actions 
t 0- i!iaY ' ~ana now? And. it it d.aesn't sat isf',. these present 
demands does it make any difference whether or not it, 
as an Absolute Truth, exist? "We have to liTe to-day 
by what truth 'we can get to-day, ana be ready to-morrow 
to call it false-aood if it aoes not satisfy. Truth 
with a b1& T and in the singular claims abstractly to be 
recogn1zea, but concrete truths in the plural need be 
recognized only when both relate to tne situation, but 
when neither does trutA is as little 01 a duty as false-
1 
hooci.. " 
1. .Tames, "The Pra.cmati'st' s Conception of Truth". Journal 
of' PhilosOphy, PsychololY and Scientific Metho4s, lV:6 
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In other words we must find a. theory that will 
work; which will be a medium between our for.mer truths 
and new experienoes; it must destroy preTiou8 beliets 
as little as possible and it must termina.te sensibly in 
sornethinl that can be truly Terifie4. It is only the 
symbols of reality that we deal with when we treat of the 
cosmic and the abstract; realities are in our private, 
personal phenomena. ThuB the Pragmatists believe in a 
greater number of realities than do the so-callet orthodox 
philosophers. They are interested in the reinterpreta-
tion of the uniTersal realities, in such a way as will 
authorize the accreditin&, without depreciation, concrete 
empirical consoious centres of action and passion. Be-
liefs are in themselves real, and they manifest their 
reality in shapin, the reality ot o~her real thin,s; in 
their realities they cannot be bias, the preferenoes 
and the affections, the neets and the endeaTors of per-
sonal lives, with the values of character ascribed to 
things whereby the latter are made wort.hy of human ac-
quaintanoe and responsiTe to human intercourse. To be 
sure realities are commonly supposed to be experiences 
other than our own. But the Pracmatist woul .. never listen 
to this, which i!nores the praotical appeal of his ar-
«ument. Personal communion is essential to knowledce. 
"The unre:flect1Te warl. 15 full (if pra.ctioal Taluesj and 
o~ their ends and means, of their effectiTe adaptatioRS, 
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1 
or control and relulation of conduct in Tiew of results." 
This does not mean that there is no thou,ht at all in 
this so-called. "unreflective worl''', for there is doubt-
less many an act of thought to effect the or~anization 
of our most common practical region of Talue. "This only 
indicates that thought does take place in such a world; 
not after a wor14 of bare ~) 1stenceBJ lackin, value 
specifications; and that the more systematic reflective 
we call organized science, may, in some fair sense, be 
aai4 to come after, but after affeotional, artistic ana 
, 
., tr echnologloal interests, which have found realization 
, 2 
and expression in bulldln& up a wor14 ot values." Truth, 
therefore, 1s not static, nor 1s it a completely finished 
, 
somewhat, but it 1s inseparabl~ from its content. It is 
sought and foun~ in the world of experience, of incessant 
chan«e of contents, together with time, space, means, 
ends, memory, intention, antioipation and so rorth. 
, , 
After accepted will the Absolute Idealist's 
theor.y work; will it satisfy in every day experienoe? All 
the wicked.ness anQ eTil that we see, can we say that it 
is all for the total 1004, that it is a part of the whole 
and, there~ore, necessary in the totality of thin,s. Do 
we not rather feel that we, as well as the wor14, wouli 
have been practically better off i~ that terrible murder 
1. Dewey, cTohn.- "Studies in Logical Th.eory", p. 43 
2. Dewey, John.- "Studies in Logical Theory", p. 43 
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had not occurred. Can we reconcile ourselTes to the 
occurrenc e of cireadful disast era on the st rength ot some 
cold, tar away somewhat called. the Absolute. But must we 
not rather feel that, that which makes for the ';004 now, 
here, with immediacy is the good., B.nd beinr; good. now will 
necessarily make :for the ,ood. in tiJme to come. After a.ll 
is not theoretical truth essentially determined by prac-
tical Talue? Is it possible for us to separate our 
.intellectual f"unction from the whole complex of our a.c-
tiTities 60 that it 'rill be able to function absolutely 
independent of our practical life? Will not those prin-
ciples which fail to work practioally, just throu«h their 
failure ot adaptation, become eliminated throuch the 
process of surTiTal ot the fittest? 
But with our knowledge 4eriTatlT8 from conduot 
distinot moral responsibilities in a really definite 
way are set up and throup this ethical attitud.e we are 
set free from the Absolutist's theory of an indefinite 
uni verse which makes us feel so determined that all efforts 
on our part is alleTiatinc our own or other's sufferinC 
are o~ no avail; and by dOing away with this nl~htmare o~ 
Absolute Reality we are brought ~ace to face with reality 
as it really is in our own individual concrete experience, 
where we can will to belleTe, to '0, and actually ac-
complish. Knowledge is one, and the true and the beau-
ti~ul must be practically usetul. Our only way o~ know-
inc the truth of our knowledge, 1s by the practical 
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working out in experienoe, and in the meantime we will 
to believe in our proposition. We oan never reach Reality 
for there is "no bell that rings" when that goal is reach-
ed. So vdth our interests and desires, we fDr.m by means 
of our intellect, our system of ·knowled.ge, usinc our 
faith to believe, that as long as our practical ends are 
reaohed we are on the true road to Ab80lu~~ Reality if 
there is such a thine_ 
So we see that Truth is Tolitional in its or1~in, 
and is real only in that it satisfies a~d works in our 
concrete indi Tifiual experiences. But Tf,~uth is more than 
this, it is true instrumentally also. For the scientist 
theories are neither t rue nor false, but only more or 
less use~ul in his practical experiments. The atomio 
tkeory 1s just about completely discardet, and no one 1s 
-
takin, an,. seriolls note .of it, for sometb.1n& that . works 
better, and giTes betterresulta has been aaopte4. So 
long as this method. o~ instrumentality ot theories waS 
used. only in the laboratory no complaint was hear •• 
But now when it 1s attemptei to apply the same metho4 in 
the field of metaphysics there is a ,reat commotion. 
014 beliefs are hard to giTe up; rather patch and mend 
them i~ necessary, to meet the opponent's ar~ument, than 
, 
to throw them completely away, for they are Tery precious. 
But this is all n0nsen§8 to hold on to an old docma when 
it no longer explains nor completely satisfie. Thou,ht 
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is instrwmental always in character, haYing for its only 
object the diacoyery o~ ways in which the purposes and 
neeas ot the practical life can be realizea in action; 
and the t est of the adequacy of the theory :which it pro-
mulcates is found in the practical success which it 
achieTes. The possession of true thou,hts always means 
the possession ot right means to right act ion. And 58 
the possession of truth is not an end, but is a state of 
progression. "When a movement in our experience of any-
kind. whatever inspires us with a thought that it is true, 
that means that sooner or later we aip by that thou,ht's 
guidance into the particulars of experience again and 
' 1 
make adyantageeus connection with them." 
Pragmatism is decreei as being mere "subjectiT-
ism", and the critics hold up their hands in utter hor-
ror at the outrage ot reduclnl all knowledce to mere 
BubjectlTlsm. To be sure, "heed", "Present" and "Im-
mediate are all subjective catagorles. "Need" does haTe 
a close connection with :feelinc, but at the same time 
-. 
it has some idealization. Gritics a«ree that the 
"need" arises from the situation, but when it comes to 
interpretinc the "situation" they disagree. Though 
thought is realtiTe to the "need" and "need" arises from 
the "situation", they say that. the "situation" 1s 
momenta.ry and ItsubjectiTe". :But every reflectiTe a.t-
1. James, "The Pragmatistts Conception of Truth", 
Journal of PhilosophY, Psychology & Scientific Methods, lV:6 
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titude and function whether ot naiTe life, deliberate in-
Tention.' lor controlled scientific research, has arisen 
through the medium of some such total objectiTe 
"situ.ation". And the Pragmatist's objection is not in-
different to or independent ot or unmodified by 
"thought... There is no connection between the Absolut ist' s 
general definition of truth and error, and the standard 
aotually employed in testing any particular judgment. 
This war against a practical philosophy very 
quickly reminds one of the st ruggle some few centuries 
a«o for the maintenanc e of the classics to tRe exclu-
sion of the nwna.ni.t:i~.e',fI in educational ayst ems. Theo-
retical knowledge was preferred to the more practical 
and that whi'ch had to do wi th the eTery day needs ot 
man. So it has been with philosophy. For it has larce-
ly fallen into the hands ot hermit like thinkers, who 
are no longer concerned with the lont;inc ot the human 
heart; and philosophy has become abst Ta.ct) Bomethinc to 
.~ . 
iYe e-buned and laughed at eTen by some of our most cul-
tured men. But philosophy since it is a theory of life 
ought to be of interest to every man and ought to oon-
tain the praotical interests ot man. And why not a 
study of humaner philosophy as well as a humaner cur-
, 
ricul~m in our school system. 
Philosophers hitherto have adopted the a priori 
method of establishing philosophioal da.ta, but tHe only 
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natural starting point is to take man himself t0~ grant-
ed and then to oonsider man's world of experience as it 
has come to seem to him. There is a human interest baok 
o~ all philosophy and a human purpose as its goal. It 
oould not be wi th.out this human touoh, tor man is work-
ing, striT1ng and thinking ~or man. Then why not admit 
this faotor, which neoessarily exists in every man's 
reasoning, and start clearly and honest 13" in our 
philosophical systems. 
Nothing in the UniTers8 1s absolute and fixed, 
, -
but rea.li ty and t rutk are changing with every sun ri S8 
and sun set, and it cannot be otherwise, fo~ mants pur-
poses and demands are constantly changing and these de-
mands must pe met by our theories if they are to be o~ 
any aonse~uenoe or truth or reality. In neither theoret-
ical nor praotioal ~uestions can the truth or falsehood 
of a matter be deoided by its correspondence to some 
Abstraot Ideal Theory which is ~ar and remote from the 
situation and needs of the m~ment, but it is deoided by 
its warmth and nearness to our demands and by its prao-
tioal working out in the round of experienoe. The Truth 
cannot be superhuman, but must be human and applioable to 
our human needs, and beyond this truth can haTe no mean-
ing f'or us. 
The eternal truths are merely postulates tllat 
we J'lJake in our experience, because we feel that' in or;4\ier 
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that there may be a cosmos fit to live in we need them. 
, 
The reason that so many of us come to perceiTe the same 
post ulat as is because we m~t, in order that we may 11 T8 
together. Our histories bear us out in this statement' , 
for we can see that those who peraeiTe things in the 
same way prospered at the expense of those who did not, 
proTing that the objectiTity of our own perceptions is 
practical and useful. We haTe, a perfectly legit lmate 
right to contend that the right , 'mderstand1ng and that 
the real meaning of theoretical questions are for him 
only who will use them for practical purposes, for 
theoretical ' t ruth is subordinate to practical t ruth 'for 
practical ends. 
To be sure there are some who study art for 
art's sake, and theorize as an end in itsel'f, and you 
s,ay that there 1s no practical issue here and that those 
people have no practioal result in mind. But still the 
anawer,-There 1s a great deal of knowledge which is 
called useless and a~~ually is useless for certain pur-
poses, but there really is nothing which 1s useless 1n 
all cases. Much that is oalled useless is so because 
certain people ref'ua8 to use it, and in this case it may 
-
be called indirectly useful. A great deal , of mat hemati0 8 
would come' under this head. Again some knowledge may 
be useful as logically completing a system of knowledge 
" " 
which is useful in other parts, while as a whole its 
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use is not yet perceiTed, or there is a great deal ot 
knowledge which is comparatiTely useless, because the 
time spent in acquiring it might .haTe been more usefully 
employed ill other ways. No matt er how theoret 1c alone 
may become, there is always a personal desire for this 
theoretical study, a feeling of co~ort only when near-
est the height of theoretical knowledge, and one eTer 
teels that as far as he himselr is concerned, this 1s 
the only thing of value and practicability in this life 
for him. :But this case is the exception and it is the 
majority ot conditions that we must notice, where 
praoticability is not theoretical. 
Above eTerythlng else Pragmatism giTes P$ a 
boyant, optimistic attitude toward lite and the universe. 
It is ours, and ours to will, to do and to accomplisla 
by means ot our own responsibility and actions. It 1s 
ours to proTe True and True in that it 1s useful in our 
steady progress onward. It relleTes us from agnostioism 
and skepticism in the Tarious fields to which it is ap-
plicable. Religion becomes warm and more Tital in its 
significance, for it is to be worked with, and our 
theories in regard to it to be proTen as true when they 
satisty our demands on the spiritual essence of things. 
To what this mOTement ot Pragmatism is going 
to lead us ~e can hardly tell. It is at the "Strike 
but hear mEl' st age ' and is bound to be heard in logio, 
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in psychology, in metaphysics, in sCience, in all the 
departments of man's life. It will haTe its bearing be-
cause it recognizes man's three-fold nature and its in-" 
tluence on his knowledge. And who shall say but what 
it will lead to that grand culmination toward which 
philosophy has eyer striTen, the unity of all knowledge 
under one head,- Science spelled with a capital. But 
be that as it may we can only hope that this method, so 
young as now in its development may be worked and found 
to be useful in its own theory of "usefulness", that it 
may satisfy in its own theory of "satisfactoriness" and 
in its attitude ot instrumentality toward the epistomo-
logical problems bring philosophy as a Tital problem 
home to every man and solve for him his problem ot 
being and purpose. -
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